How North Korea Pays for the Bomb—and Makes Its People Pay for Survival

Roberto Balbino | FINTECH SCB | Sunday, 25 October 2026

A bridge across the Yalu River is a useful place to reconsider what we think we know about North Korea.

On 24 October, the Financial Times reported that Kim Jong Un had crossed the newly opened bridge into Dandong to reaffirm relations with China. Daniel Tudor and Edward White described a three-kilometre, four-lane crossing that had finally opened twelve years after its construction, alongside a visit involving senior Chinese officials and the commemoration of Chinese soldiers who fought in the Korean War. A new bridge connecting North Korea and Russia had opened the previous month. [1]

The temptation is to call this an opening. In a physical sense, it is. More capacity across a border can reduce transport constraints and support larger movements of goods. But a road can widen a government’s economic options without widening the freedoms of the people who live under it.

The more consequential development is that Kim has more than one powerful neighbour interested in what North Korea can provide. China remains its dominant recorded trading partner. Russia has become a major customer for its military capabilities. For Pyongyang, that changes the bargaining environment. A government dependent on one patron must worry about that patron’s conditions. A government useful to two patrons can try to negotiate with each from a stronger position.

This is an interpretation of the incentives, not evidence that Beijing and Moscow have become interchangeable or that Kim can dictate terms to either. The country remains extraordinarily vulnerable to decisions made outside its borders. Yet vulnerability and bargaining power can coexist. A supplier can be economically small and strategically difficult to replace at a particular moment.