The Minerals Are Not the Money
Who captures the value? A Fintech SCB Sunday Read
Central Asia is increasingly described as the next great answer to the world’s critical-minerals problem.
The geological case is impressive.
The region holds an estimated 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, 9% of titanium and about 5% each of copper, cobalt and molybdenum. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and can export 21 of the 34 minerals on the European Union’s critical list. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hold major antimony reserves. Uzbekistan has the world’s eleventh-largest copper reserves and is developing lithium and molybdenum.
Europe wants diversification. China wants secure industrial supply. The United States wants alternatives to Chinese processing. Russia wants to preserve influence across its former economic space. Central Asian governments want investment, technology and geopolitical room to manoeuvre.
It appears to be the perfect alignment.
But geology is not development.
A country can possess strategic minerals and still capture only a small fraction of the value. The decisive assets may be located elsewhere: geological data, project finance, processing technology, transport corridors, power supply, trading networks, intellectual property, offtake contracts and the legal structures through which profits are taxed.
That is the deeper message of the OECD’s new regional report on critical minerals in Central Asia.
The world is not simply competing for ore.
It is competing to decide who finances the mine, who controls the route, who refines the material, who owns the customer relationship and where the taxable profit finally appears.
The endowment is real
Central Asia’s mineral potential is not a marketing invention.